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Bequests and Labor Supply in Germany 
ABSTRACT 
Little is known on the effects of inheritances on the working behavior of heirs. Using 
panel data for Germany, we find behavioral responses that amount up to a 16% reduc-
tion in working hours for inheritances of one Mio Euro. For the majority of beneficiar-
ies labor supply effects are, however, modest (owing to small amounts of inherited 
wealth). These results remain robust if we restrict the sample solely on those persons 
receiving an inheritance. Although more modest, higher inheritances promote a stronger 
adjustment in labor supply compared to small inheritances. In contrast to previous stud-
ies the partner does not adjust working hours and the full response takes place in the 
phase of the inheritance. Although negative income effects are present for all types of 
inheritances, behavioral responses are stronger if the heir receives liquid assets. The 
results depend, however, critically on the choice of the control group. 
 
JEL-Classification: H24, J22 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Bequests and Labor Supply in Germany* 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Taxes on wealth and transfers are controversial issues in the academic and public debate 
(for an overview: see Kopczuk, 2012). Proponents favoring high inheritance taxes high-
light that in the absence of wealth taxes inequality could rise. Utilizing data from the 
German Ageing Survey Szydlik (2004) shows that wealth is more often inherited 
among highly qualified persons. Not only the probability, but also the inherited amount 
is larger among citizens with a university background. In addition, citizens from Eastern 
Germany have a lower chance to receive an inheritance compared to their Western 
compatriots. However, utilizing data from the German Socioeconomic Panel Kohli et al. 
(2006) show that wealth inequality does not further increase. Although inheritances in-
crease absolute differences in income opportunities, they do not add to increasing 
wealth inequality, which is a relative concept of equality of opportunity.1 In addition, in 
most OECD countries wealth taxes play a minor role and constitute only a small frac-
tion of tax revenues.  
Moving to the potential behavior of the heir another important justification for taxing 
inheritances is that the heirs of a family business often lack the abilities of the compa-
ny’s founder. Recent empirical studies on the profitability of family businesses suggest 
that this argument has some validity. For example, Bennedsen et al. (2007) show for 
Danish companies that external CEOs perform better compared to the case where suc-
cession involves members of the family firm. Additional evidence supporting this hy-
pothesis is provided by Pandeacute (2006) and Villalonga and Amit (2006). Even if the 
heir shares the same entrepreneurial characteristics and carefully follows the will of the 
bequeather there is at a quite general level a deep conflict between ascription and 
achievement. As Beckert (2010) notes ascription is a concept where the social status of 
a person is institutionally embedded in the social status of the family. Rights (as well as 
obligations) depend then heavily on the position of the parents. In contrast, modern so-
                                                 
*  Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Deutsche 
Bank AG. We would like to thank Wolfgang Franz, Christoph M. Schmidt and two anonymous referees for their 
helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1  Nevertheless, these analyses are based on data before the German inheritance tax reform in 2009. Since business 
assets should be inherited more often among those on the top of the wealth distribution and business transfers are 
now mainly exempted, we speculate that the recent reform steps could promote to rising wealth inequality in the 
future. 
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cieties are characterized by achievement. Social status should depend on the perfor-
mance of the individual and not the prior performance of the parents. 
Related to this argument, inheritance taxes may be justified if they decrease the ‘la-
ziness’ of the heirs. This proposition was made more than a century ago by Andrew 
Carnegie, an industrialist and philanthropist, but has also nowadays some strong sup-
porters (Carnegie, 1995). For example, Bill Gates as well as Warren Buffett announced 
that their relatives would receive only a small fraction of their wealth, while a big share 
will be devoted to charitable giving. Both justify their decision because they are in fear 
that a large inheritance could deaden the talents of their relatives (Lowenstein, 1995).  
However, not every parent might be aware of the full consequences of an inheritance 
on the working behavior of the heirs. As in cases where the heir’s lack the ability to run 
firms, lazy heirs may be accompanied with welfare losses, too. First, a reduction of 
working hours has direct effects on output. Second, even if the reduction on working 
hours is modest, such an adjustment may indirectly reduce output whenever the human 
capital of heirs induces positive externalities. Third, more and more people will receive 
an inheritance in the OECD countries. Thus, the potential effects of inheritances on the 
will to work will become increasingly important in the future. Finally, if individuals 
reduce their labor supply after an inheritance, propositions, which favor a reduction of 
wealth inequality through inheritance taxes, could gain additional support.  
The present paper focuses on this topic, because little is known about the will to 
work after receiving an inheritance. Since it is plausible to assume that parents, which in 
the majority of cases take the role as bequeathers, are to some extent biased in their 
judgment of the will and the cognitive skills of their children, the question whether heirs 
reduce their labor supply after they receive an inheritance, is of high policy interest. 
While there is a small academic literature on labor supply effects, this point has not 
gained much attention in policy debates. For example, the German inheritance tax re-
form in 2009/2010 was mainly framed by the issue, whether heirs of family-owned 
business should – and if so how – get a reduction of the inheritance tax bill.  
For social scientists an analysis of the labor supply effects might provide fruitful in-
sights because our results could add to the debate on ascription and aspiration. Even (or 
perhaps especially) those who emphasize the role of incentives on the functioning of a 
capitalistic economy should view large tax-exempted inheritances as problematic if the 
heirs lack the necessary talent and/ or ambition. While our focus on the will to work is 
narrow, it can nevertheless add to this debate by analyzing the working behavior of the 
heir after an inheritance. Studying the effect of inheritances on working behavior might 
also provide useful insights for economists. Estimating income effects on the decision to 
work is complicated because income is at least in the long run endogenous with respect 
to the labor supply decisions. Most labor market researchers use spousal or capital in-
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come to identify income effects, but it is questionable whether these sources of income 
are not endogenous too (for a survey see Blundell and Macurdy, 1999). Studying inher-
itances might be therefore a fruitful way to identify income effects by estimating the 
effect of unearned income on labor supply. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in five ways. First, empirical evidence on labor 
supply effects after receiving an inheritance is quite scarce. From the best of our 
knowledge with the exception of Elinder et al. (2010, 2011) all studies refer to the U.S. 
(Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993; Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994; Joulfaian, 2006) and it is un-
clear how these results translate to other countries. Empirical studies show that working 
hours in the U.S. exceed those in Europe (Alesina et al., 2005). Besides different em-
ployment regulations, also differences in the spirit to work may be responsible for the 
different working patterns. Furthermore, institutional differences could have an impact 
on the comparability of results. For example, health insurance and care for elderly per-
sons are more pronounced in Germany compared to the US and these institutional dif-
ferences may push bequest motives away from unplanned events towards strategic 
and/or altruistic motives. Moreover, labor income is more heavily taxed in Germany, 
which could shift the responses towards consuming leisure. In this study, we analyze for 
the first time labor supply effects for German inheritances. Second, with the exception 
of Elinder et al. (2010, 2011) these studies analyze mainly cross-sectional data. Utiliz-
ing the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) we have panel data for a long time span 
at hand and are able to control for unobservable characteristics of the individuals in our 
regressions. Third, we share information on the spouse, which increases the validity of 
our results because it is reasonable that in some cases the partner adjusts his/her work-
ing behavior. Fourth, we show that our basic conclusion is not altered when applying on 
different research designs, i.e. different control and treatment groups. As an alternative 
to inheritances we study also gifts which share the advantage that adjustments before 
and after the treatment should be less obvious. Alternatively, when concentrating solely 
on heirs, those who receive larger inheritances show a stronger adjustment in labor sup-
ply. Thus, our basic conclusion that an inheritance is accompanied with negative labor 
supply effects is not dependent on the choice of the control (or treatment) group and 
secures us that the estimated relationships are not dependent on non-time constant het-
erogeneity between heirs and non-heirs. Finally, no study has analyzed differences in 
working behavior with respect to the type of inheritance. This question is important, 
because in many countries business assets or housing is more favorably taxed. Because 
we have information on the type of inheritance, our analysis sheds light on the issue 
whether heirs receiving illiquid inheritances exhibit different adjustment patterns. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Empirical studies on labor supply effects of unearned 
income are summarized in section two where we also derive our hypotheses. Section 
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three presents our dataset and discusses methodological issues. Results are presented in 
section four and robustness checks are performed in section five. Finally, section six 
concludes and discusses potential areas of future research. 
2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
Few studies have been carried out focusing on labor supply effects after receiving an 
inheritance. With one exception all of these studies focus on the U.S. case. (Holtz-Eakin 
et al., 1993; Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994). Besides these studies, there are a few studies 
closely related to our approach, which analyze the labor supply effects of lottery win-
ners. Kaplan (1987) suggests that shortly after persons won in a lottery labor supply was 
reduced, although there is considerable heterogeneity across people. In a similar vein 
are the results of Imbens et al. (2001): Those persons who won a large prize in a lottery 
reduced their weekly working hours compared to persons who won only a small prize 
by five to ten hours. 
Concentrating on inheritances, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) use a sample of estate tax 
records in 1982. They merge this dataset with the personal income tax returns of the 
beneficiaries for 1982 and 1985 leaving 4,332 cases for their analysis. Because they 
have information on the employment status of married couples, they are able to analyze 
the employment pattern of the partner, too. They estimate the labor supply response 
after an inheritance by applying (ordered) logit regressions for the beneficiary and the 
partner. The crucial variable of their study is whether the beneficiary participates in the 
labor force or not. Generally, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) estimate quite large transition 
probabilities. Evaluated at the sample mean, receiving an inheritance of 350,000 US-
dollar in 1982 decreases the probability of participating in the labor force by roughly 
twelve percentage points three years thereafter. Similar results are obtained when ana-
lyzing married couples: The probability that both partners work fells by 20 percentage 
points. In a similar vein is the study by Joulfaian (2006) who analyzes savings and 
working decisions for US-heirs. He matches estate tax records in 1989 with the income 
tax records of the heir in 1988 (before the inheritance) and in 1991. He concludes that 
receiving an inheritance of one mio US-dollar reduces the probability of labor force 
participation by 11%. 
Whereas Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) and Joulfaian (2006) focus on labor force partici-
pation decisions (extensive margin), Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) use working hours 
(intensive margin). Analyzing continuous measures has the advantage that also incre-
mental changes can be analyzed, because quitting the labor force is only a reasonable 
option if the inheritance is very large. The authors utilize two datasets: data on inher-
itances from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and estate tax rec-
ords are used which, however, share the disadvantage that the dataset can only be used 
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to estimate the effect of inheritances on family earnings.2 The negative effect of inher-
itance on family earnings is highest three years after receiving the inheritance. Instead, 
the adjustment behavior when using the PSID dataset is quite small suggesting – contra-
ry to the results of Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) – that inheritances do not have a large im-
pact on labor supply. 
Whereas Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) do not derive clear-cut conclusions with re-
spect to retirement decisions, Brown et al. (2010) show for a sample of elderly workers 
that receiving an inheritance of 100 000 US -dollar increases the probability that the 
worker retires by 3%. The effect is even larger if the inheritance was unanticipated. 
We are aware only of two papers which analyze the effect of inheritances outside the 
US. Elinder et al. (2010) focus on the adjustment of labor and capital income to inher-
itances. Utilizing a panel from 2002-2007 of individuals who lived in Stockholm their 
findings suggest that inheritance induces large disincentive effects on annual labor in-
come, indicating either that the heir adjusted working hours or switched to a less well-
paid job. Moreover, their findings suggest that the full adjustment does not take place 
immediately after the inheritance, but is completed after three years. However, the re-
duction in labor income is more than compensated for by an increase of capital income 
subsequently after the inheritance. 
In a latter study, utilizing a longer time span, Elinder et al. (2011) find, again, nega-
tive effects on labor income, which reach their maximum two years after the inher-
itance. Given the sparse results and the contested opinions about the inheritance tax, we 
expand the analyses of previous studies towards German inheritances in several ways. 
In line with Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) we study working hours (intensive margin) 
because the number of observations on very large inheritances is quite small in our da-
taset.3 In contrast to Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) and Joulfaian (2006) we do not focus our 
analysis solely on those people who receive an inheritance but we also evaluate labor 
supply responses across heirs and non-heirs. We expect that receiving an inheritance 
reduces labor supply through an income effect. Our first hypothesis can therefore be 
stated as follows: 
H1:  People reduce their working hours after they receive an inheritance. 
While this is a reasonable hypothesis, several caveats have to be considered: First, those 
who inherit wealth might anticipate that the beneficiaries might reduce their labor sup-
ply. Andrew Carnegie, Bill Gates and Warren Buffett are examples for such a cautious 
behavior. Although it is reasonable that the decedent is aware of such incentive effects, 
several constraints when deciding about the distribution of wealth become important. 
                                                 
2  Although imprecisely measured, family earnings serve as a proxy for hours worked. 
3  For example, we observe only 112 cases with inheritances above 100,000 Euro. 
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First, in Germany every child is at least eligible to its statutory share. Due to legislative 
constraints it is impossible to disinherit the heir (completely). Second, for many dece-
dents it might be very difficult to discriminate between dutiful and lazy heirs (Stark, 
1998). The empirical regularity that we observe in most cases equal splits between the 
heirs could point to the importance of such psychological costs (Wilhelm, 1996). None-
theless, even if the parents were able to discriminate, we would get a selection of dutiful 
persons into inheritances. This in turn would imply that the selection bias of the coeffi-
cient would be towards the null. Therefore it will be more difficult for us to detect sig-
nificant labor supply effects, as long as less dutiful persons do receive inheritances with 
lower probability. Thus, detecting a negative income effect will be a strong indication 
that income effects are present. 
In addition, whether a person adjusts its behavior after it receives an inheritance de-
pends on anticipation. If the person was already aware that it would receive an inher-
itance in the future, it might reduce its labor supply before it receives the inheritance.4 
Neglecting such expectations would again bias the coefficient towards zero. Reduction 
of labor supply is difficult, if the person is ‘monitored’ by the decedents. In this case, 
reducing labor supply too early might have detrimental effects on the inherited amount. 
Second, although it is reasonable that some heirs are aware that they will receive a 
transfer in the future, at best the rough amount of the inheritance will be known to most 
heirs. With unknown amounts labor supply effects in advance of an inheritance should 
be modest. Finally, even if the heir knows the exact amount, liquidity constraints might 
impede a strong reaction before the inheritance (Elinder et al., 2011). 
We follow Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) and utilize the question in our dataset 
whether the heir thinks that she/he will receive an additional inheritance in the future. 
From this question, we can infer whether the expectation channel has a significant im-
pact on the working behavior of the heir. Those expecting an additional inheritance 
should not reduce labor supply as long as such behavior signals laziness towards poten-
tial decedents. Therefore our second hypothesis is: 
H2:  Those heirs, who believe that they will receive an additional inheritance in the 
future, reduce their labor supply less strongly compared to compatriots who do 
not think so. 
Inheritance taxes are heavily debated because some observers emphasize the special 
role of liquidity constraints at the time when the tax has to be paid. Accordingly, one 
might think that an adjustment of labor supply depends not only on the inherited amount 
but also on its liquidity. For example, an inheritance consisting of cash or shares can be 
                                                 
4  Even without such expectation effects labor supply might be reduced before the persons inherits. As suggested by 
the exchange model of Bernheim et al. (1985) the heir might spend more time together with his/her parents. 
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more easily sold at the market than a house or business assets. In addition, as Beckert 
(2008) notes different normative justifications exist in order to (de-)legitimize inher-
itances. According to Beckert (2008) these principles can be classified by the degree of 
autonomy the testator has in distributing his/her wealth and the addressor of the inher-
itances. Whereas in Anglo-Saxon states such as the USA the community principle – a 
deep distrust toward the state combined with the idea to secure equality of opportunity – 
is the predominant view on inheritances, in Germany inheritances taxes are opposed 
because they interfere into family relationships (Beckert, 2008, p. 526-527). Therefore, 
it is reasonable to think that even in the absence of liquidity constraints, different types 
of adjustments should be observed due to the predominance of the family principle in 
Germany: Selling the house (or the company), which symbolizes the ‘lifework’ of the 
descendent is a more difficult job, than consuming ‘anonymous’ cash. Thus, owing to 
liquidity constraints and/or psychological costs we can derive hypothesis 3: 
H3:  Labor supply effects will be more pronounced if the person receives liquid assets. 
Finally, it is less certain whether the beneficiary reduces labor supply after an inher-
itance in all cases. We account for this by analyzing the labor supply effects of the part-
ner. By doing so, we treat the labor supply of the husband as exogenous. Taken together 
we expect that people receiving (large) inheritances reduce their labor supply. Besides 
the amount of the inheritance, the responsiveness should depend on expectation effects 
and the liquidity of assets. 
3 DATA AND METHODS 
We use data from the GSOEP, which is a household survey for Germany collected an-
nually by the German Institute of Economic Research (DIW Berlin), for the period 
ranging from 1984 to 2008 (see Haisken-De New and Frick, 2005; Wagner et al., 2007, 
for a detailed description). In 2001 respondents were asked whether they received an 
inheritance and if so, they were asked to provide further information about the inher-
itance, namely the year they received the inheritance, the amount and its type – house or 
property, stocks, cash, business assets or other types –, by whom they received the in-
heritance and if they expect to receive an inheritance in the future. We used the infor-
mation about the year of the inheritance of each respondent to merge the inheritance 
data up to 2001 with a panel data set containing person specific information – yearly 
hours of work, yearly individual labor income, household post government income, 
household asset income, life satisfaction, educational attainment, disability, number of 
children and marital status – of each respondent from the year 1984 to 2008. The analy-
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 173) 
- 8 - 
sis concentrates on West Germany, because for the Eastern part the first wave started in 
1991.5 
We focus our analysis on dependent employment for three reasons. First, working 
hours on the self-employed might be more imprecisely measured compared to depend-
ent employment. Second, the number of cases on self-employed persons receiving an 
inheritance is too small in our data set to study their behavior seriously. Third, there is 
ample evidence that inheritances might be not only associated with disincentive effects 
but can serve also as a new source of financing. For this special group access to capital 
implies that working hours might be even expanded if self-employed persons are liquid-
ity constrained.6 
In our basic regressions we compare the labor supply of heirs with non-heirs. Here 
we use the following panel regression model (equation 1) with individual and time fixed 
effects to estimate the effect of inheritances on the yearly hours of work. 	
Yit  kxk,it 1Inheri tancei (t1)
k
 i t it    (1) 
Y are yearly hours worked, μ1 measures the impact of the inheritance (or gift) on hours 
worked either of the beneficiary or the partner, β are the parameter estimates for our 
control variables xk and λi are individual fixed effects. Time effects are captured by ηt in 
order to control for reductions in working hours attributed to recessions. Employing 
individual fixed effects is necessary to estimate the time profile after receiving an inher-
itance, because beneficiaries may differ significantly with respect to the rest of the pop-
ulation. In our basic specification the sample is restricted to persons with positive hours 
of work because our aim is to identify labor supply responses. For persons who already 
do not work disincentive effects through inheritances cannot arise by definition.7 How-
ever, from a purely statistical point of view, trunctation of the sample can lead to biased 
                                                 
5  The results remain nearly identical when including East Germany. The dataset shares only a few number of cases 
for the Eastern part. 
6  Indeed previous studies show that receiving an inheritance increases the probability to start a business (Blanch-
flower and Oswald, 1998). As Fairlie and Krashinsky (2012) have shown, on a more general level household 
wealth increases the likelihood of selection into entrepreneurship and this selection steadily increases across the 
distribution of wealth. While wealth may be more endogenous compared to receiving an inheritance the authors 
show that their results remain robust when concentrating on a more exogenous measure of wealth, i.e. unantici-
pated housing price changes. In addition, self-employed persons receiving an inheritance are more likely to per-
form better compared to those who do not receive an inheritance (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994). 
7  We therefore implicitly followed the approach proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) and Joulfaian and Wilhelm 
(1994) who concentrated their analysis on the working population. 
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coefficients. Accounting for this we estimated a probit model where at the first step the 
decision to work was modeled as a function of our explanatory variables, a gender 
dummy and educational attainment. The predicted values of a positive labor supply 
were then introduced in the second step of our analysis in order to correct for selection 
effects. 
When testing for the relevance of the expectation channel we use a question from the 
SOEP where the respondent is asked whether he/she presumes to receive an additional 
inheritance in the future. In addition, we analyze whether liquid (cash, stocks) or illiquid 
(house or property, business assets, other types) inheritances have a (different) impact 
on labor supply adjustments. We disaggregate inheritances into dummy variables in-
cluding the amount of the inheritance for the respective asset type. Whenever the heir 
does not receive an inheritance of the respective asset category the variable takes a val-
ue of zero. 
We employ a number of socio-demographic controls to account for potential hetero-
geneity among individuals. First, we expect that persons sharing disabilities work only 
to a lesser extent. We control for this effect by a simple dummy variable. Second, the 
existence of children might induce different effects on working hours. On the one hand 
even the primary earner of the family might work less compared to persons who do not 
have children because in many companies a norm that employees with children leave 
the workplace earlier might be existent; on the other hand existence of children might 
cause an increase in hours worked in order to keep the standard of living. Thus, the net 
effect for employees with children is unclear. Third, we introduce the marital status of 
the person and control for the age of the respondent. Younger persons should work 
more, whereas elderly persons might decide to work less, because they have already 
accumulated wealth and can effort less working hours. An alternative channel promot-
ing less work among the elderly is that Germany has several governmental programs 
favoring part time work. Therefore we introduce age with a quadratic term to allow for a 
bell-shaped relationship.8 If a nearby-person dies the heir might suffer and for this rea-
son might reduce working hours. We control for this effect by utilizing a question on 
the well-being of the person. Finally, we control for net household wealth and the labor 
income of the employee. Higher income should increase the incentive to work more 
hours. Note, however, that the income of the employee could be endogenous with re-
spect to working hours. We have experimented with several alternatives, but they were 
weak according to the first stage F-statistic or not really exogenous according to Han-
sen’s J test. We used an instrument variable estimator, where all variables of the second 
stage were regressed together with different combinations of educational achievement, 
                                                 
8  Another factor, which is able to explain less working hours for the elderly, are segmented labor markets. 
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industry sector dummies as well as dummies on work experience on income. Since 
weak instrumental variables can lead to even greater biases than fixed effects regres-
sions without instrumentation (see Murray, 2006), our preferred models are those with 
fixed individual and time effects. All monetary variables, e.g. labor income, household 
asset income and inheritances, are measured in prices of 2005. 
Our basic identification strategy rests on the comparison of employees who receive 
an inheritance with those who do not. This approach was also undertaken by Joulfaian 
and Wilhelm (1994). By following this approach we control for several variables, which 
could be different between these two groups. Moreover the fixed effects estimator se-
cures that all time-constant differences (e.g. ability or gender) is kept in the individual 
fixed effects. 
However, even when including these control variables it might be possible that (un-
observed) time-varying heterogeneity between beneficiaries and those who do not re-
ceive an inheritance remains. For example, heirs might adjust their labor supply before 
the inheritance because they have to take care of their relatives. In the aftermath of an 
inheritance it might be necessary to reduce working hours because the death of a nearby 
person can result in substantial effort arranging the funeral or the heir reduces working 
hours simply because of grief. 
We propose several approaches to cope with time-varying heterogeneity. First, ad-
justments due to caring or grief are only present in the case of inheritances but not if we 
analyze inter vivo transfers. Therefore, we use gifts as an alternative measure to study 
wealth effects. Secondly, instead of a different treatment group (i.e. gifts), we use a dif-
ferent “control group”. For this reason we follow the approach proposed by Holtz-Eakin 
et al. (1993); Elinder et al. (2010, 2011) and – by analyzing lottery prizes – Imbens et al. 
(2001). We provide robustness tests when concentrating solely on those persons who 
receive an inheritance (or a gift). By concentrating on this more homogenous group we 
identify labor supply effects by the amount of inheritances. Thus, when concentrating 
solely on the heirs, those who receive a higher inheritance should more heavily adjust 
their labor supply. When restricting the sample to heirs using a panel regression model 
with individual and time fixed effects is not suitable, because the amount of the inher-
itance is constant across time for every individual and will be captured by the individual 
fixed effects then. Therefore we estimate equation 1 with a fixed-effects vector decom-
position estimator proposed by Plümper and Troeger (2007) (see table 7).9 Finally, an 
Ashenfelter (1978)-dip can be alleviated if one looks on variation over a longer time 
span. Instead of yearly variation we use as a robustness check three year averages be-
                                                 
9  The fixed effects vector decomposition estimator has not been without critique, see the Symposium in Political 
Analysis 19:2. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 173) 
- 11 - 
fore and after the inheritance. In that case we identify the labor supply response by a 
simple dummy in the post-inheritance period.10 
4 RESULTS 
Before turning to the regression results, it is useful to provide some descriptive statistics 
about our dataset in table 1 and table 2. In total, out of the 12,657 persons in our sample 
290 inherited and 221 persons received a gift. Unsurprisingly, the distribution of inher-
itances is skewed to the right (figure 1). Whereas the average amount is 129,561 Euro, 
50 percent of the beneficiaries receive less than 48,342 Euro. The results are similar for 
gifts: The average amount is 125,688, 50 percent received less than 48,544. Thus, for 
the majority of the beneficiaries quitting the job will be an unfeasible strategy, because 
the amount of the inheritance (or gift) will be too low. Disaggregating by type of inher-
itance shows that the average inheritance on housing and business assets is by far higher 
than average cash inheritances. When comparing gifts and inheritances among different 
donors, the average amounts are similar. One exception are gifts between married per-
sons, perhaps because tax considerations play a role when transferring wealth towards 
the partner. 
The persons in our dataset work on average 1,843 hours per year, which is by far less 
than in the USA. Note that people who receive an inheritance do work slightly less than 
their counterparts who do not receive an inheritance. This difference is not statistically 
different according to a mean difference t-test (t-value: 0.61; p-value: 0.54). A similar 
relationship holds for gifts (t-value: 0.15; p-value: 0.88). With respect to the control 
variables, average yearly gross labor income in Germany is approximately 33,235 Euro. 
On average, labor income as well as the heir’s educational background is significantly 
different from that of non-heirs. Persons receiving an inheritance (or a gift) have on 
average a higher labor income. According to a mean difference t-test the yearly labor 
income of heirs is significantly higher at the 1 percent level compared to non-heirs (t-
value: -6.78; p-value: 0.00). Similar results can be observed for gifts (t-value: -8.41; p-
value: 0.00). Finally, with respect to human capital we see that heirs share a higher edu-
cational attainment. Given that wealth is more often inherited among highly qualified 
people this result is not surprising.11 
                                                 
10  Because heirs and non-heirs share different characteristics with respect to educational attainments, we further 
estimated models where we split the dataset on persons (heirs and non-heirs) with an academic degree and those 
who do not share an academic background. In both cases, we find more or less negative labor supply effects. Re-
sults are available upon request. 
11  Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) derive the same result in their U.S.-dataset. Using a different survey Szydlik (2004) 
also shows for the German case that wealth is more often inherited among persons with a university degree. 
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Figure 1:  Kernel density of the amount of the inheritance 
 
Source: Own calculations, SOEP 
Table 1: Inheritance, descriptive statistics 
  
Persons receiving  
an inheritance  
Persons receiving  
a gift  
Number of persons 290 221 
Average amount bequest/gift  129,561 125,688 
From whom inheritance or gift    
One or both parents  62% 73% 
Average amount  154,600 132,158 
Parents-in-law  3% 7% 
Average amount  203,323 101,143 
Grandparents  11% 10% 
Average amount  53,779 112,842 
Husband or wife  2% 1% 
Average amount  169,321 440,568 
Other's 22% 9% 
Average amount  71,822 72,244 
Type of bequest   
Liquid  56% 61% 
Average amount 45,139 50,713 
Illiquid  29% 35% 
Average amount 197,075 251,226 
Both types  15% 4% 
Average amount 334,606 132,777 
Source: Own calculations, SOEP 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
  
Persons receiving 
an inheritance  
Persons receiving 
a gift  
Persons receiving 
no inheritance / 
gift  
Working hours  1,834 1,841 1,844 
Gross yearly labor income  36,854 39,741 33,057 
Household asset income  3,384 2,948 1,866 
Age  45 41 40 
Life satisfaction (scala 1 to 10 (highest)) 7.29 7.23 7.25 
Married  71% 72% 62% 
Children  51% 52% 40% 
Disabled  6% 4% 6% 
Educational attainment (ISCED)        
(2) Lower secondary educatin  11% 9% 16% 
(3) Upper secondary education  47% 39% 53% 
(4) Post-secondary non tertiary education 5% 8% 5% 
(5) First stage of tertiary education  12% 18% 9% 
(6) Second stage of tertiary education  25% 26% 17% 
Source: Own calculations, SOEP 
Figure 2 provides a graphical analysis of the working patterns disaggregated by the 
amount of the inheritance:12 For all quartiles of the distribution we observe a downward 
shift in working hours which – depending on the amount of the inheritance – starts 
slightly before wealth is inherited. Whereas the adjustment profile for persons receiving 
the median inheritance is similar to that of wealthy beneficiaries, people in the lowest 
quartile adjust their working hours more modestly. While this first descriptive impres-
sion is in line with a view emphasizing the importance of income effects, table 3 shows 
the results for our basic specification. Column (a) provides the results of the fixed ef-
fects regression without controlling for sample selection, whereas tables (b-e) show es-
timates when applying the sample selection correction (Inverse Mills-ratio). Column (e) 
uses gifts instead of inheritances as an alternative treatment group. As can be seen, disa-
bled persons and respondents with at least one child work less. In addition, a bell-
shaped relationship between the age of the person and working hours can be observed. 
Turning to our variable on inheritances, we see that the income effect is across all 
specifications significant and negative. Increasing inheritances by 100,000 Euro reduces 
yearly hours worked by around 30 hours (table 3 specifications a-e). Evaluated at the 
sample mean a person receiving the average inheritance of 130,000 Euro reduces work-
ing hours by 1.6 percent. Thus, a person who receives a very large inheritance of – say 
                                                 
12  Similar patterns can be ovserved for gifts. They are available upon request. 
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more than one million Euro – reduces labor supply by approximately 300 hours, which 
is evaluated at the sample mean a reduction of roughly 16% percent in working hours. 
Figure 2:  Changes of yearly working hours before and after the inheritance (t=0 year 
of inheritance) 
 
Source: Own calculations, SOEP 
While for the majority of beneficiaries labor supply effects are modest (owing to small 
amounts of inherited wealth), for large inheritances the disincentive effects are sizeable. 
Although the relationship between inheritances and the will to work is robust and evi-
dence for hypothesis 1, there is no evidence in favor of hypothesis 2. Beneficiaries, who 
expect to get an additional inheritance in the future, do not work more compared to per-
sons who do not. Column e shows the results for those who receive a gift. Qualitatively 
the results remain unchanged when studying gifts instead of inheritances. 
Table 3:  Effect of an inheritance/gift on labor supply: heirs vs. non-heirs 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
 Inheritance Gift 
Inheritance or gift  -46.39** -33.16** -33.13** -32.71** -24.82** 
  (-2.54) (-2.11) (-2.11) (-2.08) (-2.50) 
Labor income  736.77*** 240.19*** 246.59*** 246.56*** 265.25*** 
  (10.29) (5.57) (5.65) (5.65) (6.09) 
H asset  -137.99*** -23.09 -21.15 -21.09 -36.21 
 income  (-3.52) (-0.52) (-0.48) (-0.48) (-0.78) 
Age  37.91*** 4.89 11.43*** 11.47*** 9.93*** 
  (9.17) (1.40) (3.21) (3.22) (2.80) 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
 Inheritance Gift 
Age2  -0.54*** -0.14*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.18*** 
  (-11.22) (-3.41) (-4.81) (-4.82) (-4.32) 
Life  8.66*** -13.19*** -12.84*** -12.83*** -10.86*** 
satisfaction  (4.83) (-6.94) (-6.77) (-6.77) (-5.64) 
Disability,  -167.04*** -154.23*** -151.71*** -151.66*** -139.95*** 
dummy  (-8.78) (-9.03) (-8.89) (-8.91) (-8.42) 
Children  -221.30*** -192.67*** -175.69*** -175.63*** -176.25*** 
dummy  (-21.66) (-20.18) (-18.83) (-18.82) (-18.63) 
Single,    119.09*** 119.15*** 112.69*** 
dummy    (7.19) (7.20) (6.73) 
Widowed,    -41.44 -41.20 -2.34 
dummy    (-0.83) (-0.82) (-0.05) 
Divorced,    38.65** 38.66** 38.96** 
dummy    (2.06) (2.06) (2.01) 
Separated,    -1.57 -1.52 -8.46 
dummy    (-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.44) 
Inheritance or gift     -19.08 -2.83 
expected, dummy     (-0.30) (-0.05) 
Constant  1208.86*** 2242.02*** 2040.85*** 2039.85*** 2041.34*** 
 (14.72) (27.75) (24.31) (24.33) (24.05) 
Inv. Mills-ratio   -684.28*** -684.19*** -684.26*** -635.04*** 
   (-25.73) (-25.69) (-25.69) (-22.92) 
Person fixed effects  yes 
Time fixed effects  yes 
Observations  83121 82489 
Persons  12567 12547 
R2 overall  0.26 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 
R2 within  0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 
R2 between  0.26 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.41 
Note: The dependent variable is yearly working hours and the amount of the inheritance or gift is lagged by one 
period. All regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the level of the individual. T-values 
are given in parentheses. Star levels *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
Source: Own calculations, SOEP 
5 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
So far, we have shown that individuals adjust their labor supply after receiving an inher-
itance. In this section, we address four additional issues. First, it could be the case that 
also the partner adjusts labor supply. Second, up to now, we have concentrated our 
analysis on the year after the heir receives an inheritance. Alternatively, if the heir has 
some knowledge about the gift or inheritance, adjustment may take place earlier. There-
fore, we present some sensitivity analysis for adjustments on former years. Thirdly, alt-
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hough we observe a similar reaction in the case of inter vivos transfers we propose al-
ternative tests to address the issue of time-varying heterogeneity. We analyze labor sup-
ply effects by solely concentrating on the heirs. There are many reasons why heirs and 
non-heirs could differ, for example, because an inheritance involves not 
Table 4:  Reactions of the partner (only inheritances) 
  (a) (b) (c)  (d) 
Inheritance  5.035 6.133 6.015 6.249 
 (0.61) (0.82) (0.80) (0.83) 
Inheritance    -10.687  
expected, dummy    (-0.20)  
Heir’s partner variables:  
Labor income  274.445*** 269.377*** 270.175*** 270.218*** 
  (7.33) (7.33) (7.33) (7.33) 
Age  42.655*** 62.658*** 64.313*** 64.317*** 
  (8.27) (12.76) (12.97) (12.97) 
Age2  -0.587*** -0.858*** -0.873*** -0.873*** 
  (-10.34) (-15.68) (-15.82) (-15.82) 
Disability,  -133.600*** -132.617*** -132.409*** -132.402*** 
dummy  (-7.34) (-7.33) (-7.32) (-7.32) 
Children   -218.081*** -214.118*** -214.104*** 
dummy   (-18.25) (-18.10) (-18.09) 
Single,   64.033** 64.056**  
dummy   (2.19) (2.19)  
Widowed,   98.238 98.240  
dummy   (0.94) (0.94)  
Divorced,   -5.963 -5.949  
dummy   (-0.16) (-0.16)  
Separated,   19.287 19.292  
dummy   (0.39) (0.39)  
Constant  1216.744*** 1005.006*** 957.125*** 956.990*** 
  (10.70) (9.32) (8.77) (8.77) 
Person fixed effects   yes   
Time fixed effects   yes   
Observations  67654 
Persons  10684 
R2 overall  0.093 0.080 0.080 0.080 
R2 within  0.029 0.045 0.045 0.045 
R2 between  0.142 0.127 0.127 0.127 
Note: The dependent variable is yearly working hours of the partner of the heir and the amount of the inheritance is 
lagged by one period. Except for the inheritance variable all other independent variables are personal characteristics 
of the partner. All regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the level of the individual. T-
values are given in parentheses. Star levels *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculations, SOEP 
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only a transfer of wealth but also the death of a person to whom the heir (often) had a 
close relationship. In this case our counterfactual is not the non-heir anymore but the 
amount the heir receives. Those heirs receiving only a small inheritance should show 
only small labor supply effects. Thus, effectively we focus on a different control group. 
As a final alternative, instead of relying on yearly data, we average the periods before 
and after the inheritance and measure labor supply responses by an inheritance dummy. 
Finally, given that some assets are less liquid than others are, we expect that it is more 
difficult to adjust in these cases. 
It seems reasonable that not only income, but also wealth might be pooled together in 
partnerships. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) provide evidence that when focusing on partner-
ships the probability of quitting the labor force increases from 12 to 20 percent. This 
result indicates that the adjustment of the partner is somewhat lower, though reasonable. 
Table 4 shows the results when we focus on the labor supply of the partner. Note that 
the control variables refer (with the exception of the inheritance amount) to the heir’s 
partner.13 As can be seen, in contrast to Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) we cannot find any 
labor supply responses when focusing on the partner. 
Table 5:  Effect of an inheritance on labor supply: heirs vs. non-heirs, different lags 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 Inheritance 
Inheritance (t-5) 13.384     16.017 
  (0.71)     (0.84) 
Inheritance (t-4)  7.360    -5.024 
   (0.45)    (-0.38) 
Inheritance (t-3)   7.038   2.804 
    (0.48)   (0.18) 
Inheritance (t-2)    16.662  4.795 
     (1.06)  (0.24) 
Inheritance (t-1) -36.080** -40.744*** -42.575*** -49.447*** -32.705** -43.922** 
  (-1.98) (-2.77) (-2.83) (-2.91) (-2.08) (-2.15) 
Labor income 139.165*** 159.994*** 190.112*** 217.288*** 246.557*** 84.954** 
  (3.35) (3.41) (4.29) (5.06) (5.65) (2.23) 
HH asset -77.509** -12.217 -22.198 -31.710 -21.092 -72.648** 
income (-2.17) (-0.20) (-0.33) (-0.49) (-0.48) (-1.97) 
Age 27.078*** 20.031*** 21.523*** 17.909*** 11.470*** 27.557*** 
 (5.00) (4.11) (4.97) (4.50) (3.22) (4.72) 
Age2 -0.332*** -0.290*** -0.283*** -0.264*** -0.199*** -0.351*** 
  (-5.45) (-5.24) (-5.70) (-5.75) (-4.82) (-5.36) 
Life -10.636*** -12.145*** -13.628*** -13.379*** -12.834*** -10.954*** 
satisfaction (-4.25) (-5.24) (-6.33) (-6.62) (-6.77) (-4.26) 
                                                 
13  We also experimented with the controls of the partner, but results were similar. They are available upon request. 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 Inheritance 
Disability, -171.537*** -160.992*** -157.323*** -154.315*** -151.658*** -170.701*** 
dummy (-7.59) (-7.70) (-8.14) (-8.38) (-8.91) (-7.12) 
Children -156.440*** -164.570*** -172.061*** -173.045*** -175.631*** -152.297*** 
dummy (-12.56) (-14.17) (-15.79) (-17.08) (-18.82) (-11.65) 
Single, 98.344*** 90.867*** 97.172*** 115.758*** 119.145*** 90.191*** 
dummy (4.45) (4.40) (5.06) (6.36) (7.20) (4.01) 
Widowed, -36.514 -7.754 -8.150 -20.836 -41.201 -16.276 
dummy (-0.48) (-0.11) (-0.14) (-0.38) (-0.82) (-0.20) 
Divorced, 18.277 40.130* 30.396 39.514* 38.662** 20.686 
dummy (0.81) (1.78) (1.41) (1.94) (2.06) (0.85) 
Separated, 5.028 7.202 -1.152 4.571 -1.515 -2.912 
dummy (0.20) (0.31) (-0.05) (0.21) (-0.08) (-0.11) 
Inheritance -31.900 -35.847 -26.326 -18.274 -19.080 -65.295 
expected,  
dummy (-0.37) (-0.47) (-0.37) (-0.27) (-0.30) (-0.69) 
Constant 1680.847*** 1901.243*** 1804.991*** 1918.515*** 2039.847*** 1729.564***
 (13.42) (16.73) (17.86) (20.60) (24.33) (12.84) 
Inv. Mills-ratio -750.279*** -741.109*** -748.649*** -719.507*** -684.261*** -728.701*** 
  (-23.42) (-23.42) (-25.19) (-25.61) (-25.69) (-20.45) 
Person fixed 
effects yes 
Time fixed 
effects yes 
Observations 43821 51114 59456 69021 83121 40073 
Persons 7591 8408 9368 10410 12567 6812 
R2 overall 0.360 0.349 0.359 0.345 0.337 0.339 
R2 within 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.103 0.102 0.097 
R2 between 0.438 0.430 0.454 0.433 0.416 0.431 
Note: The dependent variable is yearly working hours and the amount of the inheritance is lagged by one period. All 
regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the level of the individual. T-values are given in 
parentheses. Star levels *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculations, SOEP 
Table 5 presents the same regressions as in table 3 where we additionally include lags 
from t-5 up to t-2. For example t-5 measures whether we observe an adjustment five 
years before up to two years before the inheritance. Thus, these additional regressors 
give some advice whether the heir adjusts prior to the inheritance. As can be seen none 
of these coefficients measuring prior adjustments is statistically significant. Therefore, 
there is little evidence that heirs reduce working hours prior to the inheritance because 
they are well-informed. Accordingly, the main response takes place one year after the 
heir receives the inheritance.14 This permanent response is similar to those shown in 
                                                 
14  Thus, labor supply responses take immediately place after the inheritance. This result is somewhat in contrast to 
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table 3. Heirs receiving an inheritance of one Mio Euro permanently decrease their 
working hours by roughly 300 hours. 
Up to now, we have compared heirs with non-heirs. In order to reduce heterogeneity 
across time we average the yearly variation in our dataset. We focus on three-year aver-
ages before and after the inheritance. Moreover, we focus now solely on heirs (or solely 
on persons receiving a gift). Table 6 provides a descriptive overview before and after 
the treatment. Those who inherited wealth reduced their labor supply by more than 200 
hours, whereas the reactions for inter vivo transfers are smaller. While these results are 
smaller compared to those when using non-heirs as a control group, they nonetheless 
suggest that negative incentives to work are present after a person receives large trans-
fers.15 
Table 6:  Average working time three years before and after receiving an inher-
itance/gift, descriptive statistics 
 Inheritance Gift 
3-year average pre post pre post 
Number of persons  186 147 
Amount  125,690 122,925 
Working hours  1829 1611 1781 1671 
Gross yearly labor income  35,959 33,784 35,478 37,095 
Life satisfaction  7.42 7.30 7.46 7.29 
Source: Own calculations, SOEP 
Finally, from a policy perspective it is important to know whether labor supply effects 
depend on the type of inheritance. For example, the German reform of the inheritance 
tax in 2009 exempts the value of housing from the parents towards the children (as well 
between spouses).16 In addition, in many countries business assets are taxed more lightly 
than private property. Although there may be many pros and cons against preferential 
tax treatments of specific asset types, an important justification of preferential tax 
treatment would be that heirs do not adjust (or adjust to a lower extent) in case of illiq-
uid assets. 
Testing this argument requires that we differentiate between liquid and illiquid inher-
itances.17 Liquid assets contain cash transfers and assets which can be sold at the stock 
                                                                                                                                               
those of Elinder et al. (2010) who show that the full adjustment takes places after three years. 
15  Results remain stable in a multivariate analysis. They are available upon request. 
16  However, exemption is only granted if the child (or the husband) does not rent or sell the house to third persons 
within a time span of 10 years. 
17  An alternative, with less demanding restrictions on the equality of the control variables is to split the sample into 
illiquid and liquid inheritances. We have also experimented with a sample split and derived nearly identical re-
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market, whereas illiquid assets are business assets, the value of housing and other types 
of inheritances (for example paintings). 56 percent of the bequests involved a transfer of 
liquid assets, 29 percent illiquid assets, and in 15 percent of the cases, both types of as-
sets were transferred (see table 1). Receiving solely illiquid assets serves as our refer-
ence group. 
Table 7 shows the results. According to the estimates the labor supply response in-
creases markedly when the heir gets liquid assets compared to the case where the bene-
ficiary receives only illiquid assets. However, in the case where the heir receives both 
types of assets the responses are strongest. The latter result corresponds with the de-
scriptive impression indicating that larger amounts of wealth are transferred if the heir 
receives both types of assets. However, when including additionally non-heirs to our 
sample our regression results do not remain stable.18 
Table 7: Liquid and illiquid inheritances (heirs/donee only) 
 (a) (b) (c)  (d)  (e)  (f) (g) 
  Inheritance Gift 
Liquid inheri-
tance/gift,  -106.126*** -54.525*** -56.630*** -61.971*** -76.550*** -76.550*** 20.263 
dummy  (-4.99) (-2.62) (-2.74) (-3.02) (-3.74) (-3.74) (0.93) 
Liquid and 
illiquid,  -290.557*** -198.250*** -223.713*** -211.913*** -226.145*** -226.145*** -149.750*** 
dummy  (-9.26) (-6.49) (-7.34) (-7.00) (-7.46) (-7.45) (-2.66) 
Labor income  2518.474*** 1005.909*** 964.939*** 954.480*** 991.925*** 991.925*** 208.847*** 
 (62.85) (14.92) (14.38) (14.26) (14.91) (14.90) (4.00) 
HH asset  -206.837*** -67.293 -69.672 -84.298* -54.351 -54.351 -171.373** 
income  (-4.31) (-1.42) (-1.48) (-1.81) (-1.15) (-1.13) (-2.51) 
Age  92.889*** 51.616*** 44.844*** 69.688*** 79.250*** 79.250*** 87.198*** 
 (10.74) (5.69) (4.97) (7.48) (8.40) (8.38) (7.46) 
Age2  -0.944*** -0.439*** -0.359*** -0.663*** -0.741*** -0.741*** -0.821*** 
 (-10.24) (-4.40) (-3.61) (-6.37) (-7.08) (-7.07) (-6.12) 
Life  13.651** -21.350*** -22.009*** -18.325*** -14.741** -14.741** -22.753*** 
satisfaction  (2.15) (-3.31) (-3.44) (-2.88) (-2.31) (-2.30) (-3.33) 
Disability,    -347.235*** -345.029*** -346.627*** -346.627*** -281.676*** 
dummy    (-10.56) (-10.57) (-10.60) (-10.59) (-5.88) 
Children     -218.547*** -188.932*** -188.932*** -224.081*** 
dummy     (-9.96) (-7.98) (-7.97) (-8.25) 
Single,      249.904*** 249.904*** -86.813** 
dummy      (7.89) (7.83) (-2.13) 
Widowed,      -589.634*** -589.634*** 237.014** 
dummy      (-11.77) (-11.76) (2.32) 
Divorced,      218.565*** 218.565*** 21.464 
dummy      (4.58) (4.57) (0.58) 
                                                                                                                                               
sults. They are available upon request. 
18  Results are available upon request. 
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 (a) (b) (c)  (d)  (e)  (f) (g) 
  Inheritance Gift 
Separated,      214.806*** 214.806*** 59.654 
dummy      (3.56) (3.56) (0.87) 
Inheritance  
or gift       -0.000 -0.000 
expected, 
dummy       (-0.00) (-0.00) 
Constant  
-
1451.137*** 235.880 423.379 8.574 -357.892 -357.892 -41.439 
 (-5.62) (0.88) (1.58) (0.03) (-1.31) (-1.30) (-0.13) 
Inv. Mills-
ratio   -771.361*** -761.893*** -720.398*** -686.713*** -686.713*** -896.693*** 
  (-19.92) (-19.79) (-18.65) (-17.81) (-17.81) (-21.48) 
eta  1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (46.60) (41.08) (41.40) (41.72) (42.11) (42.07) (40.72) 
Person fixed 
effects     yes    
Time fixed 
effects     yes    
Observations    2377    1840 
R2  0.817 0.827 0.830 0.832 0.835 0.835 0.841 
Wald test of equality of coefficients  
(first row: F-statistic and second row: p-value)   
Liquid =  39.79 25.57 34.82 28.40 28.37 28.09 9.77 
liquid and 
illiquid  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: The dependent variable is yearly working hours, the amount of the inheritance is lagged by one period and the 
sample is restricted to heirs only. Panel fixed effects with vector decomposition. T-values are given in parentheses. 
Star levels *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculations, SOEP 
6 CONCLUSION 
Utilizing panel data for Germany during the time span from 1984 to 2008, we have fo-
cused on labor supply adjustments after receiving an inheritance. How do our results 
relate to existing studies? First, we find negative labor supply effects after individuals 
receive an inheritance, reaching its maximum shortly after receiving the inheritance. 
Using different approaches to estimate income effects our results indicate that a one mio 
Euro inheritance is accompanied with a reduction between 150 and 300 hours of work. 
This result is in line with previous research. Second, when analyzing the behavior of the 
partner we do not find an adjustment. This contradicts the finding of Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1993), because these authors show that also the partner, though more modestly, adjusts 
working behavior. 
From an economic policy perspective our results might provide useful insights. First, 
– equity considerations could lead to the justification of inheritance tax, because – in 
line with previous research – our results indicate that wealth is inherited less often 
among poorer households. Secondly, negative labor supply effects provide – besides 
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equity considerations – even from an allocative point of view a justification for an in-
heritance tax. Thirdly, more favorable taxation of business assets and housing might be 
justified to some degree, because the adjustment of people receiving those assets is 
smaller compared to those receiving only liquid assets. 
We stress three points, which we think are important and we have to leave to future 
research. First, we were not able to derive robust results when analyzing liquid and il-
liquid inheritances. Given this conflicting evidence, further research is needed in order 
to derive clear-cut answers with respect to our third hypothesis. Moreover, because li-
quidity constraints as well as psychological barriers could account for different respons-
es it seems worth to differentiate between these competing hypotheses in future re-
search. Second, the empirical literature, which looks on wealth in general (Fairlie and 
Krashinsky, 2012; Lindh and Ohlsson, 1996) and more specifically on inheritances 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Schäfer et al., 2011) on entrepreneurial activity, con-
cludes that those with higher wealth or more specifically higher inheritances establish 
more often new firms. Therefore, for a comprehensive evaluation of the inheritance tax 
one has to identify whether entrepreneurial activity after an inheritance is a) in the long 
run successful and b) is based on specific types of assets. While there is a small amount 
of empirical literature available with respect to a) (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994; Schäfer and 
Talavera, 2006), we are not aware of studies analyzing b). In order to test these hypoth-
eses one has to link those studies analyzing entrepreneurship after inheritance with dis-
aggregated data on the type of inheritance.  
Finally, although quitting the labor force is only a feasible strategy for a small frac-
tion of lucky ones, these cases will gain increasing importance since more and more 
wealth will be inherited in Germany (and other OECD countries) in the next decade. 
While we have shown that heirs adjust their labor supply after receiving an inheritance 
it is an open question what they do in their spare time. Of course enjoying the freedom 
of a sweet life, will be a tempting option for some, but it could be the case that at least 
some heirs “payback”, either through donations and / or through voluntary work in non-
profit organizations. Because the normative implications of an inheritance tax hinge to 
some extent on these options, it would be interesting to analyze the behavior of heirs 
beyond labor supply effects, an exercise, which we leave for future research. 
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